A Bigger Tent Needs Stronger Stakes

Democrats can win everywhere without accepting everyone who can win somewhere.

Large open canvas tent filled with people, anchored by stakes labeled liberal democracy, constitutional government, pluralism, public safety, regulated market economy, individual rights, and democratic allies.

A bigger political tent can welcome many people, but only if it is firmly anchored by shared democratic principles.

I am not a Democrat. CIVPAC is not a Democratic organization. We support Democrats, Republicans, and independents when we think they represent a more responsible, centrist, democratic, and politically realistic alternative.

So any advice I offer Democrats is, by definition, unsolicited. But the Democratic Party is one of the two major governing parties in the United States. Its internal arguments matter even to those of us who do not belong to it.

Two Ideas in Tension

Right now, Democrats seem caught between two ideas that are both partly right.

The first is the “win everywhere” idea. I have argued before that both parties should try to compete beyond their comfort zones. A serious national party should not write off whole regions, classes, religions, or cultures. Democrats should want candidates who can compete in cities, suburbs, small towns, working-class communities, and rural areas. They will not all sound alike, and they should not all sound alike.

A party that wants to govern the whole country should try to understand the whole country.

The second idea is James Carville’s warning about the Democratic Socialists of America and the far-left edge of the Democratic coalition. Carville has argued that Democrats need to consider something close to a schism with some DSA-aligned candidates. His point is blunt but not foolish: if candidates who reject core assumptions of liberal democracy, pluralism, public safety, capitalism, or America’s basic alliances run under the Democratic label, Republicans will use those candidates to define the entire party.

That is not paranoia. That is politics.

But there is an obvious tension. How can Democrats “win everywhere” if they are also drawing sharper boundaries around who belongs in the party?

The answer is that “win everywhere” does not mean “accept everyone who can win somewhere.”

A Big Tent Still Needs a Floor

A democratic political party has to be broad. It has to include people who disagree on taxes, health care, immigration, policing, climate, foreign policy, and cultural issues. It has to make room for candidates who fit their communities. A Democrat running in rural Georgia should not have to sound like a progressive activist from Brooklyn. A Democrat running in Brooklyn should not have to sound like a rural Georgia moderate.

Local variation is not the problem. It is the point.

But a party also needs a floor. It needs some basic commitments that define what the party is and what it is not. For Democrats, that floor should include liberal democracy, constitutional government, pluralism, public safety, a regulated market economy, individual rights, and a foreign policy that does not treat America’s democratic allies as morally indistinguishable from its adversaries.

That still leaves room for a wide range of Democrats. It leaves room for progressives, moderates, labor liberals, suburban pragmatists, Black church Democrats, national-security Democrats, and former Republicans who broke with Trump over democracy and the rule of law.

But it does not require Democrats to treat every anti-capitalist, anti-police, anti-Israel, anti-party, or anti-pluralist candidate as merely one more flavor in the big tent.

That is the mistake Carville is reacting against.

The Fetterman Test

I thought about this while rereading my earlier post, “A Centrist on the Road.” On that trip, I spoke with a Democratic Party activist from a northeastern state. She described herself as left wing but not far left wing. We agreed that Democrats needed to reach voters outside their normal constituencies. But she also reportedly wrote Senator John Fetterman urging him to leave the Democratic Party.

That struck me then, and strikes me even more now, as a perfect illustration of the problem.

It is easy to say the party should broaden its coalition. It is harder to accept the actual people who make a broader coalition possible.

A party cannot become more competitive in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Wisconsin, Georgia, Arizona, North Carolina, or Maine if it treats every culturally heterodox Democrat as a betrayal. If Democrats want to win outside safe blue territory, they need candidates who sound plausible outside safe blue territory.

The Fantasy of Purification

There is also a darker suspicion, held in some quarters, that some DSA and far-left Democrats do not mind seeing moderate Democrats lose in competitive districts. Moderate losses weaken the party’s center of gravity. They make it easier for ideological activists to argue that the old coalition has failed and that the party must be remade in their image.

The fantasy seems to be that if the Democratic Party becomes uniformly left wing enough, millions of hidden voters will suddenly emerge from the woodwork and propel it to national power. That theory has always struck me as closer to faith than analysis. It ignores the voters who actually decide competitive elections. It also treats losing winnable seats as an acceptable price for ideological purification.

That is not “win everywhere.” That is lose strategically and call it progress.

Disagreement Is Not Disqualification

The right answer is not to purge the left. Nor is it to purge the center. The right answer is to distinguish between disagreement and disqualification.

Disagreement is normal coalition politics. A Democrat who is more cautious on spending, more supportive of policing, more hawkish on foreign policy, or more skeptical of progressive cultural language should not be pushed out of the party. Such candidates may be exactly what Democrats need in places where they currently lose.

Disqualification is different. A candidate who rejects liberal democracy, excuses political violence, denies basic pluralism, or treats the Democratic Party merely as a ballot line to be captured is not simply a different kind of Democrat. That candidate is challenging the party’s identity.

So the lesson is simple:

Do not purge the center in the name of ideological purity.

Do not absorb the anti-liberal left in the name of coalition unity.

That is not hypocrisy. It is coalition discipline.

The Same Advice Applies to Republicans

I would offer Republicans the same unsolicited advice. There are elements on the far right that seem to have found a home in the Republican Party — indeed, may have seized control of much of it — and they may have permanently damaged the Republican brand. But that is a subject for another post.

The Goal Is a Stronger Tent

The broader principle applies to both parties. A healthy party should be wide enough to hold real disagreement and strong enough not to collapse under the weight of people who do not believe in the core principles of the coalition itself.

The goal is not a smaller tent.

The goal is a stronger tent.

“Win Everywhere”: A Virtuous Cycle for American Politics

The Rivera report on the Democrats’ 2024 loss is an odd document.

It appears to contain some useful insights. It also appears unfinished, poorly rolled out, and only grudgingly released. The Democratic National Committee held the report for months before releasing it under internal pressure. DNC Chair Ken Martin then distanced himself from it, saying he was “not proud” of the product and that it did not meet his standards. The DNC also attached a disclaimer saying it could not verify many of the report’s claims because it had not received the underlying sourcing, interviews, or supporting data.

That is not how a serious political party should handle a serious post-election review.

Still, buried inside the Rivera report is an idea that both parties should take seriously: Democrats need to organize everywhere to win everywhere.

That phrase matters.

In fact, it may be the key to a healthier American politics.

What “Win Everywhere” Should Mean

I would take “win everywhere” more literally than political consultants usually do.

Obviously, no party will actually win every race. Politics is competitive. If one party improves, the other party will adapt. Some districts are deeply Republican. Others are deeply Democratic. Not every race is polled, and not every race can realistically be close in any given cycle.

But the aspiration should be clear:

A healthy political party should try to make every election genuinely contestable.

Conceptually, every serious party should want to nominate candidates who could poll within the margin of error before Election Day if voters were paying attention and both parties were competing seriously.

That is not because every candidate will win. They will not.

It is because the discipline of trying to win everywhere would force both parties to become better.

A Democrat running in rural Georgia should not sound like a faculty-lounge progressive from Brooklyn. A Republican running in suburban Maryland should not sound like he is auditioning for a Trump rally. Candidates should fit their communities while still reflecting their party’s broad principles.

That is what political parties are supposed to do.

They are supposed to persuade.

Why the Impossibility Is the Point

The reason “win everywhere” cannot fully succeed is also the reason it is so important.

If Democrats became more competitive in rural America, small towns, the South, and working-class communities, Republicans would have to adapt. They could not rely as easily on Trump loyalty, cultural resentment, and the assumption that Democrats are unacceptable by default.

If Republicans became more competitive in cities, suburbs, college towns, and diverse metropolitan areas, Democrats would have to adapt too. They could not rely as easily on progressive cultural shorthand, demographic assumptions, or opposition to Trump as a substitute for persuasion.

That competitive response is exactly what the country needs.

The goal is not permanent one-party dominance. The goal is healthier competition.

When both parties have to compete everywhere, both parties have to listen. They have to recruit better candidates. They have to moderate their language. They have to understand local concerns. They have to stop treating entire categories of voters as either deplorable or morally superior.

In short, both parties would have to become less obnoxious.

That may be the best argument for “win everywhere.”

Democrats’ Bad Habit: “Failure to Communicate”

The Rivera report appears more reasonable than the progressive response to it because it recognizes real Democratic weaknesses with men, rural voters, non-college voters, Latino voters, irregular voters, and voters in Middle America and the South. AP reported that the report criticized Democrats’ focus on identity politics and said Harris “wrote off rural America.” Reuters similarly reported that the report faulted Democrats for failing to engage men, rural voters, non-college-educated voters, and irregular voters.

That is useful.

But Democrats often make the same mistake after losing: they describe the defeat as a failure to communicate.

Sometimes that is true. Sometimes the message was unclear, the candidate was poorly defined, the campaign failed to respond, or the party did not show up.

But sometimes voters heard the message clearly enough and did not like it.

That distinction matters.

Immigration was not merely a communication problem. Inflation was not merely a communication problem. DEI rhetoric was not merely a communication problem. Cultural overreach was not merely a communication problem. The Trump campaign’s “they/them” ad was effective not simply because Democrats failed to answer it, but because many voters already suspected the party had become too willing to indulge the cultural left.

A party that wants to win everywhere cannot treat every voter disagreement as a misunderstanding.

It has to ask whether voters understood the party’s priorities and rejected them.

The Democratic Lesson

For Democrats, “win everywhere” means more than opening field offices in red counties.

It means becoming plausible to voters outside deep-blue cultural environments.

That does not mean becoming Republican. It does not mean abandoning civil rights, immigration reform, climate policy, abortion rights, or concern for vulnerable groups.

It means learning to speak about those issues in a way that does not sound contemptuous of ordinary people.

Democrats need to stop assuming that voters who dislike immigration disorder are xenophobes. They need to stop assuming that voters who dislike DEI rhetoric are racists. They need to stop assuming that voters who reject progressive language about gender are bigots. They need to stop confusing academic vocabulary with moral seriousness.

People of good will can address the real concerns of transgender people without appearing so open-minded that their brains fell out.

A party that wants to win everywhere has to be able to say that.

It also has to be honest about inflation. Biden-era transfers were politically understandable during COVID, but in retrospect the additional fiscal stimulus was poorly timed. When supply chains were still broken and production capacity was constrained, aggressive transfers increased demand faster than supply could respond. That made inflation more likely, and Democrats then paid the political price for seeming surprised by a result that should have been easier to anticipate.

That is not a messaging problem.

It is a judgment problem.

The Republican Lesson

Republicans need the same discipline.

A Republican Party that wants to win everywhere cannot define “Republican” as “loyal to Donald Trump.”

It cannot treat every dissenting conservative as a RINO. It cannot indulge election denial, cruelty, corruption, or authoritarian rhetoric and then wonder why it struggles in suburbs, cities, college towns, and diverse communities.

A serious Republican Party should have room for fiscal conservatives, libertarians, national-security conservatives, business conservatives, social conservatives, moderates, and populists. Those factions will disagree. That is what political parties are for.

But when loyalty to one man becomes the organizing principle, a party stops being a coalition and becomes a personal vehicle.

That is bad for Republicans. It is also bad for the country.

If Republicans wanted to win everywhere, they would need candidates who could speak to voters who care about fiscal discipline but reject chaos. They would need candidates who can talk about crime without sounding cruel, immigration without sounding bigoted, religion without sounding theocratic, and patriotism without sounding authoritarian.

That would make the Republican Party better.

The Virtuous Cycle

Here is the point that matters most.

If one party seriously tried to win everywhere, the other party would have to respond.

That response would create a virtuous cycle.

If Democrats competed seriously in rural and working-class districts, Republicans would have to stop taking those voters for granted. If Republicans competed seriously in urban and suburban districts, Democrats would have to stop taking those voters for granted.

More races would become real contests. More candidates would have to persuade. More voters would matter. Fewer politicians could survive by appealing only to activists, donors, cable-news audiences, or primary electorates.

That is how American politics could improve.

Not because one party becomes dominant.

Because both parties become less complacent.

A healthy democracy does not require one party to win everywhere. It requires both parties to believe they should try.

Why This Matters to CIVPAC

CIVPAC’s interest is not in helping Democrats win for the sake of Democrats, or Republicans win for the sake of Republicans.

Our interest is in making both parties better.

The country benefits when Democrats are forced to understand rural, religious, working-class, culturally moderate, and non-college voters. The country also benefits when Republicans are forced to understand urban, suburban, secular, immigrant, educated, and racially diverse voters.

Both parties need to compete for voters who are not already on their side.

That is how parties become less ideological, less arrogant, and less captured by their loudest activists.

It is also how voters get better choices.

Too many Americans are politically homeless because each party has learned to survive by making the other party unacceptable. Democrats rely on fear of Trump. Republicans rely on fear of the cultural left. Both strategies can work electorally. Neither strategy produces a healthy democracy.

“Win everywhere” offers a better discipline.

It says: do not write off voters. Do not caricature communities. Do not nominate candidates who can only speak to the converted. Do not assume that the other party’s failures are enough to excuse your own.

The Right Lesson From Rivera

The Rivera report may be unfinished. It may be poorly sourced. It may be incomplete. It reportedly sidesteps some of the hardest questions, including Biden’s decision to seek reelection, and the rushed elevation of Harris after Biden withdrew.

But the “win everywhere” idea is right.

The Democrats need it. Republicans need it too.

A party that wants to govern the whole country should try to understand the whole country. It should put forward candidates who can compete in places where the party usually loses. It should want every voter to believe that their vote matters and that both parties are capable of speaking to them.

That is not naïve. It is the competitive logic democracy is supposed to produce.

The country does not need one party to win everywhere.

It needs both parties to try.

That effort would force each party to listen more, preach less, and nominate candidates who can appeal beyond their own base.

That is the virtuous cycle American politics badly needs.

Of course, not everyone would welcome this. The activist wings of both parties benefit from safe-seat politics. Progressive activists have more power when Democrats only need to win deep-blue primaries. MAGA activists have more power when Republicans only need to win deep-red primaries. A genuine effort to win everywhere would weaken both groups because it would force candidates to persuade voters outside the ideological comfort zone. That is one reason the strategy is so attractive. It would return power from activists to voters.